We present a model in which schooling transmits the values of a host society to the children of a minority community that cares about its traditional values. The evolution of community values is governed by a dynamic process that is driven by the extent to which parents expose children to formal education. It is shown that the dynamic process can lead to separation, assimilation, or a melting pot. Separation arises when the community choose not to participate in formal education in order to preserve traditional values but at the cost of perpetually low incomes. If all families in the community choose education then the steady state is either assimilation (the convergence of the community values to the …xed values of the host society) or a melting pot (the values of the host society adjust to those of the community). The steady state level of education may be non-unique, and are Pareto-ranked with the highest steady state level being Pareto-dominant. Simulations are used to illustrate the dynamic paths that can arise.
Introduction
Immigration has featured as an increasingly important political issue in European debates over the past two decades, and the integration of migrants into their host societies is a subject raising anxieties both in the recipient countries and amongst the migrants themselves. One of the most important channels for integration is the schooling process. In the United Kingdom, nearly three quarters of teachers (72%) regard the promotion of British values as part of a teacher's role, with one in …ve teachers (21%) seeing this as a central part.
1 This is despite the fact that the poll found that there were a signi…cant proportion of teachers (36%) who did not identify strongly as being British.
2 For many immigrant communities the consequence of schooling is that their values and the values of the host society gradually converge over time until the community is assimilated within the host. One remarkable example is the history of the Jewish community that developed in the East End of London from 1880 onwards. Approximately 120,000 immigrants from Eastern Europe settled in Spital…elds between 1881 and 1914 with the concentration such that the population of some districts was up to 95 per cent Jewish; the area had over 40 sinagogues, and Yiddish was the predominant language on street signs and in newspapers. However, according to the Board of Trade report of 1894, "children left the Jews'Free School on Bell Lane 'almost indistinguishable'from English children. Religious rituals also gradually became less distinctive, and fewer people spoke Yiddish." 3 This once large, vibrant and distinctive community has now been entirely absorbed into British society and, in the East End, only the historical record remains. This paper models how the values of the host society, promoted by the system of education, and the values of a migrant community interact in shaping the identity of the new generation of the community members. The analysis shows how values change across generations when children's values are shaped both by their families and their schooling, so that the reference norms for each new generation can be di¤erent from those of the previous one. We trace the dynamic interaction between the values and show when the process will lead to either assimilation of the community or lasting separation between the community and the host society. The important policy conclusion is that separation results from the education of community children being restricted by their parents to prevent or minimize exposure to host society values. This leaves the community in a permanently disadvantaged economic position due to the low level of education that is chosen.
There exists a large literature looking at the social and economic position of migrants and their children in Europe and North America (for a comprehensive review see Corak, 2004 ; and for a recent study of the Canadian case see Aydemir et al., 2009 and . The common …nding is that some socioeconomic outcomes are transmitted from immigrant parents to their children, though convergence to host society outcomes also occurs over time. For example, Blau et al. (2008) found that after two generations education and labour supply of immigrants converge to those of the host population (between 4 and 13 per cent of education and between 3 and 4 per cent of labour supply shortfall); fertility, however, shows more persistence (between 16 and 42 per cent of excess fertility remains).
Research on the evolution of ethnic identity by immigrants shows that values are important to the process of creating an ethnic identity and the latter is then an important determinant of economic choices. Constant et al. (2009) de…ne ethnic identity as 'the balance between commitment or self-identi…cation with the culture and society of origin and commitment or self-identi…cation with the host culture and society, achieved by an individual after migration'(p.276), and discuss possible outcomes of the process in terms of assimilation (cultural and social conformity), integration (strong identi…cation with ethnic culture and social conformity to host society), marginalization (weak cultural identi…cation and weak social conformity), and separation (strong identi…cation to culture of origin and weak involvement in host society). Reese (2001) discusses the adaptive struggle faced by Mexican immigrants in the United States trying to raise children who would do well economically but not fall prey to the 'moral dangers'of the host society. These processes are not uniform across immigrant communities and depend on a variety of factors, including children's gender: Patel et al. (1996) , for example, show for the case of Gujarati immigrant families in the US that parental attitudes and behavior are a¤ected di¤erently by factors such as modernity, acculturation, and time in the US, depending on parent's and child's gender.
These and similar …ndings in the sociological and economic literature provide evidence of a process of values transmission across generations, in ‡uenced by the values of the host society and mediated by various policy channels addressing social inclusion. In this paper we concentrate on the e¤ect of education, and, in particular, on the mitigation of the degree of conformity with school norms by the conformity with community norms (a re ‡ection of the ethnic and social mix of the neighborhood of residence). In our model the frame of reference for each generation are the norms of their parents and those of the host society. Social norms and values have long featured in explanations of individual and group behavior by economists since the early work on social norms and conformism by Akerlof (1980) and Jones (1984) . At the same time, the role of identity in individual welfare and decision-making has only relatively recently featured in economic models. Our approach falls within the tradition of the economics of social norms and identity (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000) in which norms act as motivating devices and the inherent sociability of humans creates a loss of utility from not conforming with the prevailing norms. The key assumption in our model is of two-way interaction of values between a minority community and the host society. This interaction occurs through the system of education, so that the evolution of values over time is determined endogenously. This is in contrast to the approach introduced by Bisin and Verdier (2001) and developed, for example, in Saez-Marti and Sjogren (2008) and Jeanne (2009, 2010) , who model the evolution of values as a random process with exogenously …xed probability distribution. Kanbur (2005, 2007) consider a similar interaction between the values of two coexisting communities. In their framework values are modelled as a local public good, with members of the community a¤ecting them directly by choosing their contributions towards its provision. In our model the behavior of agents a¤ects the values indirectly, through the choice of education.
In the next section we present our model of educational choice and characterize the potential steady state equilibria. Section 3 explores multiplicity of equilibria in more detail using numerical simulations. In Section 4 we discuss the policy implications of the results and provide conclusions. All proofs are in the Appendix.
The Model
Consider a community of n families whose traditional values di¤er from the values of the host society outside the community. This could, for example, be a community of immigrants or a religious minority. To analyze the dynamics of the community values when new generations are exposed to the external society values through the education process we use a two-period overlapping generations model. Schooling is received in the …rst period of life, and in the second period each adult works. Each adult has only one child, and so there is no population growth. Earnings depend on education received, and are divided between consumption and investment in the education of the child. There is intergenerational altruism which motivates the provision of education; there are no bequests.
In the …rst period of life each individual receives education with the amount chosen by their parent. There is a minimal level of education, or basic skills, that can be obtained by home schooling at no cost; without loss of generality we normalize it to zero. Any formal education beyond this minimal level has a material cost. In the second period each individual works and divides their earnings between consumption and investment in education of their o¤spring. The formal education system is maintained by the host society and performs two roles: an academic role and a social role. In the academic role education enhances a student's skills and, therefore, increases his or her future labour earnings. In the social role it promotes the values of the host society and, therefore, a¤ects the identity of a student. Parents care about their o¤springs'future wealth, as well as about preserving traditional values of the community. In particular, they dislike their children's values deviating from the values currently prevailing in the community.
The adult member of family i at time t has values given by i t . The parameter i t can be interpreted as an aggregate of a number of factors (for example, respect for elderly, status of women, tolerance to pre-marital relationships, religiosity). The community mean value is the mean of the values of the adults alive at time
The preferences of adult i at time t are described by
where 
The weighting function, e i t , is assumed to satisfy
Thus, when community members are not exposed to education outside the community their values do not change. This assumption is consistent with …nd-ings from longitudinal studies of the children of immigrants. Furthermore, the assumption that the weight on host society values increases at a decreasing rate with education implies that primary education (e i t close to zero) has the strongest leverage on values. Thus, for a given a level of education, an individual will develop values closer to the community if the leverage of primary education on values is small and they are further from school norms (Akerlof and Kranton, 2002) . Conversely, an individual will develop values closer to those of the host society values if the leverage of primary education on values is large (Phinney et al., 2000) and they have a better initial …t with school norms (Goldin and Katz, 1997; Alesina et al., 1999) .
The adult in family i at time t chooses x i t and e i t to maximize their utility, U t , subject to e i t 0 and w e i t 1
where c (e) is the cost of education and w (e) is the relationship between the wage and education. We assume that
At the optimum the budget constraint binds, and the optimal e i t is determined by the …rst order condition along with the complementary slackness condition,
where
At an interior optimum the …rst condition becomes an equality so the chosen level of education equalizes the marginal bene…t from education to the marginal cost of education comprised of the physical cost of education and the marginal disutility from the change in the o¤spring's values caused by school education. When marginal cost exceeds marginal bene…t a e t = 0 the optimal choice of education is zero. It follows from the individual choice of education level that we can write
The evolution of individual values conditional on the process
is then given by the n …rst-order di¤erence equations
and the solutions combine to give the mean value (1). The process We consider two scenarios for the process
1.
H t is exogenously …xed.
In this scenario the values of the host society promoted by the educational system are not in ‡uenced by the community nor do they change over time.
2.
H t evolves according to the process
This process is intended to describe a situation when the community is in ‡uential, perhaps, because of its large size or the scope of activities, so that its values a¤ect the values of the host society.
Steady state: separation and assimilation
We de…ne a steady state of the economy as one characterized by a constant level of education across the generations in the same family, and constant community and social values. It is now shown that there are several possible types of steady state with di¤erent implications for social structure. The …rst result shows that an extreme outcome is possible in which the community remains separated from the host society. To state the result succinctly, let The outcome described in Lemma 1 is one in which no family in the community chooses to invest in education. As a consequence the values of the families in the community remain constant from generation to generation, and remain at a constant distance from the values of the host society. This steady state represents separation between the community and the host society. Moreover, because no education is undertaken the incomes of the community members remain at the minimum level. The families in the community rationally make the choice to accept low living standards in order to prevent the erosion of traditional community values.
It should be noted that a necessary condition for the outcome in lemma 1 to occur is that
because either The result that no one in the community chooses to obtain formal education is a very strong one, and, perhaps, unlikely to be observed in practice. 4 It is more interesting to explore which of the families in the community will choose to obtain education in those cases where some, but not all, choose to do so. In what follows we choose the index for the community members so that Lemma 2 shows that the community families choosing to educate there children will be drawn from those farthest from the community value on either side, that is, those farthest from both the community and the society, and those farthest from the community but closest to the society value. One group choose education so that there children move closer to the community value, while the other group are educated because they are already close to the society value so do not su¤er a signi…cant utility loss from the socializing e¤ect of education. Surprisingly, the families at the core of community, or the representatives of community values, will be those who do not choose education. The continuation of the process from period 1 onward is hard to pin down since the value of 4 The closest well-documented example to this outcome are the Amish communities in the United States. The Amish are one of the most conservative religious sects in America. They teach their children in their own schools up to the eigth grade level and do not encourage education above this level: "The Amish feel that a child who achieves a level of scholarship beyond the fundamentals of the primary grades is likely to leave the community and be lost to the church. More importantly, if a child spends the great part of his day at the high school, there is less chance he will learn to appreciate the Amish way of life." (Knudsen, 1974.) n C t o cannot be tracked without further details on the education choices. However, no matter how C t evolves the families choosing education will be drawn from one or both ends of the value distribution.
Modifying slightly the conditions of the previous argument provides an interesting case for which it is possible to describe the initial change in 
It is now observed that the position at time 1 looks just like that at time 0. Two outcomes can then occur. The …rst possibility is that the increase in
The families with values closest to the social value will then enter education because the loss from moving further from community values is reduced. The situation then mirrors that of lemma 2. The second possibility is that the movement in values of the community families with i t < C t will eventually cause them to withdraw from education. Hence, education may initially be chosen by some of the community but then the community withdraws from education. Partial education initially can lead to an ultimate outcome of separation.
The next set of results are built on the assumption that all families in the community choose education so that e The next lemma shows that if society values are constant, or always adjust towards the community values, there will be monotonicity over time in the mean level of community values over time and convergence of society and community values.
Lemma 4 (i) If process 1 applies (so The main theorem of this section provides a description of the steady state when a positive level of education is chosen by each generation.
Theorem 1 At a steady state withê i t > 0 for all i = 1; :::; n; it must be the case thatê The result described in Theorem 1 describes two alternative outcomes dependent on the process for social values. If 
Since v 00 < 0; w 00 > 0; u 00 < 0; and c 00 > 0; this equation may have more than one solution, and di¤erent solutions can have di¤erent local and global stability properties. Each solution will be a steady-state level of education, b e. Note that this condition (6) does not contain f and , and therefore the level of b e is independent of the process of adjustment. Since the community and social values are equalized it follows that^ 
Transition paths
In section 2.1 we characterized potential steady-state equilibria of the dynamic process determining values. For a policy analysis it is not just the steady state that matters. The period of transition to the steady state may be long so that it becomes important to investigate the path that the society follows to reach the steady state. In this section we investigate an example in more details using speci…c functional forms for preferences and for the weighting function. The example has the property that the community can become isolated and locked in a poverty trap, or, conversely, can become integrated into the host society. Which of these alternatives occurs depends on the degree of inclusiveness of the schooling system.
For the example we assume the following functional forms:
v (w) = ln w;
w (e) = w 0 exp ( e) ;
where a; b; p; q; r; ; are non-negative constants. In particular, we assume that the values of a and b are chosen such that assumption (3) holds everywhere along the path and in the steady state. The parameter q in the utility function measures the importance of community values for its adult members. In the analysis this is assumed to be constant across individuals.
5 Parameter a in the weighting function captures the leverage of primary education on values (thus smaller magnitudes of a correspond to higher segregation), whilst parameter b represents how fast the e¤ect of school norms on students'values weakens at higher levels of education, so that a higher magnitude of b re ‡ects a poorer …t of students with the school norms.
With these functional forms the evolution of the economy is described by the following system of equations In the simulations we allow this parameter to vary by assuming that each family is characterized by its own value of q, drawn randomly from a uniform distribution.
The solution describes the dynamics of the values of the community, given the initial conditions
o . There is a possibility, observed in the simulation below, that the realized dynamic path of the host society value is non-monotone: the host society may have a tendency to distance itself from the community at …rst, and then gradually become more tolerant and make steps towards integration. This can be done through schools that are willing to adjust to the diverse student body. The values can also diverge; the outcome depends on the initial values, as well as the model parameters. Note that the evolution of H t , when rewritten as
describes either partial adjustment at a diminishing rate or divergence at an increasing rate. In the analysis below we refer to the situation with c = d = 0 as the 'static case'.
One can see that in this economy the steady state described in lemma 1 with e t = e 0 = 0 may exist in the static case when the preferences are such that is small (parents put low weight on their children's welfare) or q is large (the parents' discontent with the change in children's values is strong). It is more likely to happen when is small (low returns to education), r and/or p are large (the material cost of formal education is high), or a is large (the e¤ect of primary schooling on children's values is strong), or when ( H 0 0 ) is large (the initial gap between the values of the community and those of the host society is wide).
The situation with adjustment is fundamentally di¤erent from the static case. Given the same con…guration of parameters, when the school, or, indeed, the host society, particularly through an inclusive schooling policy, is willing to adjust its values toward the community, it is possible that the gap between their values shrinks from t = 0 to t = 1. Thus, in conformity with lemma 4, given C 1 = C 0 when e 0 = 0 is chosen, is it easy to obtain the condition
With a su¢ cient reduction in the distance between the values, and therefore a su¢ cient reduction in the 'marginal discontent', it may become optimal for the new generation of parents to choose e 1 > 0. In the next period the gap will shrink even more as H 2 approaches C 2 , which in turn induces higher e 2 , and so forth. The process of convergence may, however, reverse, in particular, if the e¤ectiveness of indoctrination at school weakens signi…cantly at higher levels of education (b is su¢ ciently large relative to a). Thus, the outcome depends on both the schooling e¤ect and the degree of in ‡uence of the community.
We now brie ‡y analyze the existence of the steady state and the welfare implications of multiplicity of the steady states for this economy, assuming that the community members have identical preferences, so that C t = t . Using the chosen functional forms we can rewrite (6) as
where b e is the steady state level of education. Both sides of the equation are strictly increasing and convex in b e. It is easy to see that three di¤erent cases are possible:
(ii) There is a unique solution if
There are also knife-edge situations when w 0 = r= ( ) or w 0 = r= ( ) + p= 2 but these are of lesser interest. In case (iii) the two steady states are characterized by di¤erent levels of education.
The local stability property of a steady state, when it exists, is characterized in the following theorem.
Theorem 3 If a steady state with strictly positive education b e exists then it is locally stable if and only if
Simulation results
In this section we present the results of simulations of the model with a heterogenous community (q is drawn from a uniform distribution 6 ) for di¤erent combinations of the magnitudes of the model parameters. The simulations are used to discuss alternative outcomes with respect to integration, as well as how the outcome can be in ‡uenced by policy.
On the graphs below we plot the choice of education, the resulting shifts in the values of the community (blue lines) and the host society (red lines) over time, and the path of welfare. Our simulations for various con…gurations of parameter values appear to result robustly in a number of di¤erent scenarios, some of which are illustrated in the …gures below, as the most interesting representative cases. In all simulations presented in this section we use w 0 = 1; = 0:25, p = 0:2; r = 0:1; It is clear that in the second case, for which it can be said that the community is more conservative, the parent's choice of education for their child is substantially lower relative to the …rst case. Consequently, the values in the community do not change much over time. In addition, the …rst set of …gures use two di¤erent values of b (re ‡ects the …t of students with the school norms), while the second set does so for two values of d (willingness of the host society to accommodate the community).
In Figure 1 the solid curves correspond to a = 1=3 and b = 9=5, and the dashed curves correspond to a = 1=3 and b = 2=3; in both cases c = 0:1 and d = 0:5. The choice of education is higher in the second case, but the di¤erence between the two cases is relatively small. The shifts in the values, however, are very di¤erent: in the …rst case, characterized by a higher b, or a poorer …t with school norms, the values of the community and the host society diverge, while in the second case the gap between values shrinks over time. Thus, the …rst situation describes a community that is well-educated but is immune to the e¤ects of the outside culture and is not willing to integrate into the host society; this attitude causes the initial trend in the host values towards the community to eventually reverse. As the community is alienated from the host society, the latter distances itself from the community even more. In the second case, when the e¤ect of schooling diminishes slowly, the gradual shift of community values towards the host society is met by a reciprocal shift in the host society values. The gap between values eventually shrinks: the two cultures embrace each other. The welfare of the community is higher in the second case, primarily because of the smaller loss of utility due to the more gradual change in values.
The solid lines in …gure 2 correspond to c = 0:1; d = 0:5 and the dashed lines to c = 0:1; d = 0:25. The higher value of d in the …rst case means that the host society is less willing to accommodate the community when the di¤erence in values is large relative to the …rst case with lower d. (In both cases we used a = 4=3 and b = 2=3, so that the e¤ect of schooling does not diminish very much as the amount of education increases.)
It can be seen that in the …rst case the distance between the community and the host society increases over time, while education remains at a rather low level. This is because the disutility from changing values is relatively low, so the community moves towards the host society. However, at the same time the society moves away from the community. This describes a low-skilled community trying to imitate and become integrated into the host culture, while the schooling system, or, indeed, the host society continues to emphasize the di¤erence and maintains, or even increases, the distance from the community. In the second case the host society adjusts to the community, and both the educational outcomes and welfare are strikingly higher -the latter not only due to the higher earnings, but also because with the adjusting host society its values, instilled in children through schooling, are now closer to the community values and so do not cause discontent to the parents. This describes the situation when the willingness of the host society to embrace the values of the community is reinforced by the willingness of the community to adjust. Although the model provide only a simple representation of the relationship between values and education it is capable of generating a variety of di¤erent scenarios of cultural integration or segregation of minority groups. These scenarios are characterized by di¤erent patterns of human capital accumulation and welfare. The outcomes for the community under these scenarios are summarized in Table 1 .
Conclusions
This paper has presented a model of the transmission of values across generations and communities and of the e¤ect that di¤erent education and integration
high-skill, reclusive high-skill, integrated high-skill, reclusive low b high-skill, integrated low-skill, rejected high-skill, integrated The analysis has investigated both the dynamics of the process of value adjustment and the steady state of the process. It is possible for a steady state with separation to arise. In such a case the community gives such importance to values that its members prefer not to engage in education in order to prevent any change in the traditional values. The community essentially isolates itself from the host society. This steady state only arises under strong assumptions. If there is dispersion of values within the community then some may choose education for two distinct motives. Those with values far from those of the community, and even further from society, will choose education to move their children's values closer to community values. Conversely, those with values closest to society will be more concerned with the increase in children's income than with the change in values. If all members of the community choose education then all steady states must involve the values of the community becoming equal to the values of society. This can be achieved through assimilation or convergence.
Policies to reduce segregation in communities through schooling appear to be e¤ective in raising the educational attainment of immigrants'children in the long run. For a discussion of the role of institutional and social capital in migrants' integration and well-being see Della Giusta and Kambhampati, (2006) . Our simulations demonstrate that community values adjust and eventually converge to society values only if segregation is relatively low and the …t between students and school norms is relatively high. The model is necessarily simple compared to the complex reality of minority communities but it permits di¤erent evolutions of individual values and their e¤ect on broader community outcomes and reveals why social inclusion is not always attained.
Proof of Lemma 1
Observe that when e 
Proof of Lemma 3
The …rst-order condition for the interior educational choice at time t is 
where L( for all e. As a consequence e( t+1 ; C t+1 ; H ) > e( t ; C t ; H ) and the lowest chosen level of formal education (over at time t) is increasing over time. The proof extends obviously to (ii).
Proof of Theorem 1
The community members have identical preferences. Consequently, in a steady state with a positive level of education, then e This establishes the result.
